

Session 4: Online Behavioral Advertising

Anonymity & Autonomy: Evidence from Google's 2012 Privacy Policy Change

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Anonymity and Autonomy

- Anonymity as an important dimension of privacy:
 - Engage in the world without actions being traced to identity
- Autonomy:
 - Zone to make private decisions free from observation or interference
- Reduction in ability to remain anonymous can reduce autonomy
- Harms:
 - Dignity
 - Personal development
 - Society
 - Privacy protective behavior

Hypothesis

- 2012 Google announced it would combine data across platforms
- At the margin, this increased view into one's life will deter engagement in search behavior that one may want to keep private
- Measuring a reduction in autonomy due to loss in anonymity

Hypothesis

- Did people know and care?




TABLE A1
SENSITIVE AND NON-SENSITIVE SEARCH TERMS

Sensitive Terms	Average Trends Score (Jan.1, 2011 – Dec. 31, 2013)	Non-Sensitive Terms	Average Trends Score (Jan.1, 2011 – Dec. 31, 2013)
Abortion	49.1	Amazon	53.0
Acne	69.5	Apple	44.6
Adultery	37.9	Calculator	77.7
AIDS	48.0	CNN	30.3
Bankruptcy	54.8	Craigslist	73.7
Coming out	54.7	Ebay	81.0
Depression	66.8	Espn	56.3
Divorce	29.0	Facebook	77.1
Erectile Dysfunction	49.4	Games	63.0
Escort	65.6	Google	69.0
Gay	60.3	Iphone	37.4
Herpes	64.0	Mail	83.5
HIV	42.6	Maps	71.6
KKK	36.7	Netflix	58.9
Liposuction	45.5	News	53.8
Porn	85.8	Obama	11.7
Sexual Addiction	36.6	Target	40.6
Strip Club	54.7	Walmart	37.1
Suicide	49.1	Weather	39.7
Therapist	66.3	Yahoo	84.3
White power	43.2	Youtube	75.9
Total	52.8		58.1


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Results



Results

- Regression analysis
 - Setup:
 - Unit of observation: GT score for search i , during week t , in state j
 - 13k – 108k observations, depending on window
 - Week, term, and state effects in all specifications
 - Main Findings:
 - 5-10% reduction in sensitive search with +/-1 and +/- 3 month windows
 - No measurable impact with +/- 6 month window
 - Impact does not vary by state-level privacy demand

Results

- Results robust to different mixes of sensitive terms
- Falsification check for 2011 fails, but check for 2013 OK

Figure 3

Random Sample Estimates: +/-6 Month Window





Figure 5

Random Sample Estimates: +/-1 Month Window



Conclusion

- Change may have induced a small drop in sensitive search, but this faded quickly
- Limitations/Future Work:
 - Trends not volume
 - Don't have universe of sensitive search
 - Other unmeasured margins may be more important:
 - E.g., content in Gmail; viewing in YouTube

Insights from a 1-million-site Measurement of Online Tracking


Steven Englehardt
@s_englehardt

Dillon Reisman
@dillonthehuman


Arvind Narayanan
@random_walker

This research was funded by NSF award CNS 1526353, a grant from the Data Transparency Lab, and by a cloud credits for research grant from Amazon Web Services.

Visiting 2 websites results in 84 third parties contacted



Open Web Privacy Measurement (OpenWPM)



The screenshot shows the GitHub repository page for `citp/OpenWPM`. At the top, it displays the repository name and navigation options: `<> Code`, `Issues 45`, `Pull requests 0`, `Projects 0`, `Wiki`, `Pulse`, `Graphs`, and `Settings`. On the right, there are buttons for `Unwatch 49`, `Unstar 435`, and `Fork 67`. Below this, a description reads: "A web privacy measurement framework <https://webtap.princeton.edu/> — Edit". A progress bar shows repository statistics: `480 commits`, `4 branches`, `12 releases`, `13 contributors`, and `GPL-3.0`. Below the progress bar are buttons for `Branch: master`, `New pull request`, `Create new file`, `Upload files`, `Find file`, and `Clone or download`. The commit history table is as follows:

Commit	Message	Time
<code>englehardt</code>	Merge branch 'master' of github.com:citp/OpenWPM	Latest commit 3a14416 7 hours ago
<code>automation</code>	Added comments about new commands	15 days ago
<code>test</code>	disabling audiocontext test for travis CI	15 days ago
<code>nitinore</code>	Merge branch 'master' of github.com:citp/OpenWPM	10 months ago

<https://github.com/citp/OpenWPM>




The Princeton Web Census

Monthly
1 Million Site Crawl

Collecting:

- Javascript Calls
- All javascript files
- HTTP Requests and Responses
- Storage (cookies, Flash, etc)


Results of the Princeton Web Census




<https://webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/webcensus/>

Insights from the Princeton Web Census

Consolidation of top trackers




Only 6 organizations are present on >10% of sites



Takeaways of consolidation

- (1) Enforcement efforts can target large players, proactively set tracking norms.
- (2) Large trackers can quickly deploy technique to a massive number of sites.
- (3) Acquisitions can quickly shift tracking capability



Trackers Impede HTTPS Adoption

Firefox 47



Chrome 47



Trackers Impede HTTPS Adoption




Mixed content downgrades security indicator!

Trackers Impede HTTPS Adoption

Firefox 47



Chrome 47



Of sites with mixed content:


half is caused solely by third parties (10% by trackers)

Trackers Impede HTTPS Adoption

Firefox 47



Chrome 47



Of sites with mixed content:

half is caused solely by third parties (10% by trackers)

Half of all third-parties are HTTP-only


Takeaway: Tracking may have second-order privacy impacts

- (1) Slow the adoption of encryption
- (2) Identifier leakage in requests to
- (3) Can aid network surveillance efforts




New Browser Features Used for Fingerprinting


Canvas




WebRTC



Audio




Battery



<https://webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/webcensus/>

Browsers remove BatteryStatus API citing privacy



The screenshot shows a web browser window displaying the Mozilla Bugzilla page for bug 1313580. The browser's address bar shows the URL https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id. The page header includes the Mozilla logo and navigation links such as "New Account", "Log In", and "Forgot Password". A search bar is visible with the text "Search" and a magnifying glass icon. Below the header, a green notification bar states: "Persona is no longer an option for authentication on BMO. For more details see [Persona Deprecated](#)." The main content area is titled "Bug 1313580 - Remove web content access to Battery API" with a "Last Comment" link. The bug details are organized into two columns. The left column includes: **Status:** VERIFIED FIXED; **Whiteboard:** (empty); **Keywords:** addon-compat, dev-doc-needed, privacy, site-compat; **Product:** Core ([show info](#)); **Component:** DOM: Device Interfaces ([show other bugs](#)) ([show info](#)); **Version:** unspecified; **Platform:** Unspecified Unspecified; **Importance:** -- normal ([vote](#)); **Target Milestone:** mozilla52; **Assigned To:** Chris Peterson [:cpeterson]. The right column includes: **Reported:** 2016-10-27 23:28 PDT by Chris Peterson [:cpeterson]; **Modified:** 2016-11-02 09:53 PDT ([History](#)); **CC List:** 7 users ([show](#)); **Flags:** ryanvm: in-testsuite-; **See Also:** (empty); **Crash Signature:** ([edit](#)); **QA Whiteboard:** (empty); **Iteration:** ---; **Points:** ---; **Has Regression Range:** ---.

Status: VERIFIED FIXED	Reported: 2016-10-27 23:28 PDT by Chris Peterson [:cpeterson]
Whiteboard:	
Keywords: addon-compat, dev-doc-needed, privacy, site-compat	Modified: 2016-11-02 09:53 PDT (History)
Product: Core (show info)	CC List: 7 users (show)
Component: DOM: Device Interfaces (show other bugs) (show info)	Flags: ryanvm: in-testsuite-
Version: unspecified	See Also:
Platform: Unspecified Unspecified	
Importance: -- normal (vote)	Crash Signature: (edit)
Target Milestone: mozilla52	QA Whiteboard:
Assigned To: Chris Peterson [:cpeterson]	Iteration: ---
	Points: ---
	Has Regression Range: ---

Browsers remove BatteryStatus API citing privacy

The image shows two overlapping browser windows. The background window is Mozilla Bugzilla, displaying bug 1313580: "Remove web content access". The foreground window is WebKit Bugzilla, displaying bug 164213: "Remove Battery Status API from the tree".

Bug 1313580 - Remove web content access

- Status:** VERIFIED FIXED
- Whiteboard:**
- Keywords:** add-on-compat, dev-doc-needed, privacy, site-compat
- Product:** Core ([show info](#))
- Component:** DOM: Device Interfaces ([show other bugs](#)) ([show info](#))
- Version:** unspecified
- Platform:** Unspecified Unspecified
- Importance:** -- normal ([vote](#))
- Target Milestone:** mozilla52
- Assigned To:** Chris Peterson [[cpeterson](#)]

WebKit Bugzilla

Bug 164213: Remove Battery Status API from the tree

[Home](#) | [New](#) | [Browse](#) | [Search](#) | [[?](#)] | [Reports](#) | [Requests](#) | [Help](#) | [New Account](#) | [Log In](#) | [Forgot Password](#)

« First Last » | « Prev Next » This bug is not in your last search results.

Bug 164213 - Remove Battery Status API from the tree

- Status:** RESOLVED FIXED
- Product:** WebKit
- Component:** WebKit Misc.
- Version:** WebKit Nightly Build
- Platform:** Unspecified Unspecified
- Importance:** P2 Normal
- Assigned To:** Alex Christensen
- URL:**
- Keywords:**
- Depends on:**
- Blocks:** [Show dependency tree / graph](#)
- Reported:** 2016-10-30 20:26 PDT by Brady Eidson
- Modified:** 2016-11-02 14:32 PDT ([History](#))
- CC List:** 8 users ([show](#))
- See Also:** [129040](#)

Takeaway: Expect any new API to be analyzed for its fingerprintability

1. Early detection of abuse can stem adoption
2. Browsers **view fingerprinting as abuse**
 - a. Mitigate fingerprinting during standardization
 - b. Remove APIs due to fingerprinting use

Our data is available!

The data is available as bziped PostgreSQL dumps. The schema file used in all of the datasets is available [here](#).

Dataset	Comments
1 Million Site Stateless	Parallel Stateless Crawl
100k Site Stateful	Parallel Stateful Crawl -- 10,000 site seed profile
10k Site ID Detection (1)	Sequential Stateful Crawl -- Flash enabled -- Synced with ID Detection (2)
10k Site ID Detection (2)	Sequential Stateful Crawl -- Flash enabled -- Synced with ID Detection (1)
55k Site Stateless with cookie blocking	Parallel Stateless Crawl -- Firefox set to block all third-party cookies
55k Site Stateless with Ghostery	Parallel Stateless Crawl -- Ghostery extension installed and set to block all possible trackers
55k Site Stateless with HTTPS Everywhere	Parallel Stateless Crawl -- HTTPS Everywhere installed

<https://webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/webcensus/index.html#data>

Getting third-party responses from our data

```
tp_query = "SELECT r.url, h.value FROM http_responses_view AS r " \
"LEFT JOIN http_response_headers_view as h ON h.response_id = r.id " \
"WHERE r.top_url LIKE %s AND " \
"url not LIKE %s and h.name = 'Content-Type'"
```

```
cur = connection.cursor()
cur.itsize = 100000
```

```
try:
    top_ps = utils.get_host_plus_ps(top_url)
except AttributeError:
    print("Error while finding public suffix of %s" % top_url)
    return None
```

```
cur.execute(tp_query, (top_url, top_ps))
```

```
el_parser = BlockListParser('easylist.txt')
ep_parser = BlockListParser('easyprivacy.txt')
response_data = defaultdict(dict)
```

```
for url, content_type in cur:
    if utils.should_ignore(url):
        continue
```

```
url_data = dict()
```

```
url_ps = utils.get_host_plus_ps(url)
if url_ps == top_ps:
    continue
url_data['url_ps'] = url_ps
```

```
is_js = utils.is_js(url, content_type)
is_img = utils.is_img(url, content_type)
```

```
is_el_tracker = utils.is_tracker(url,
    is_js=is_js,
    is_img=is_img,
    first_party=top_url,
    blocklist_parser=el_parser)
```

```
is_ep_tracker = utils.is_tracker(url,
    is_js=is_js,
    is_img=is_img,
    first_party=top_url,
    blocklist_parser=ep_parser)
```

```
is_tracker = is_el_tracker or is_ep_tracker
```

```
url_data['is_js'] = is_js
url_data['is_img'] = is_img
url_data['is_tracker'] = is_tracker
response_data[url] = url_data
```

```
def is_js(url, content_type):
    if get_top_level_type(content_type) == 'script':
        return True
    if urlparse(url).path.split('.')[-1].lower() == 'js':
        return True
    return False
```

```
def is_img(url, content_type):
    if get_top_level_type(content_type) == 'image':
        return True
    extension = urlparse(url).path.split('.')[-1]
    if extension.lower() in IMAGE_TYPES:
        return True
    return False
```

```
def get_host_plus_ps(url):
    """Strip the URL down to just a hostname+publicsuffix.
```

```
If the provided url contains an IP address, the IP address is returned.
    """
```

```
hostname = urlparse(url).hostname
try:
    ip_address(hostname)
    return hostname
except ValueError:
    return psl.get_public_suffix(hostname)
```

```
def get_trackers(url_list, first_party, blocklist_parser=None, blocklist="easylist.txt"):
    """Identify domains that are identified as trackers from list of URLs.
```

```
Returns set of domains/IPs filtered by the given blocklist_parser.
TODO: Better to return set of domains/IPs, or list of filtered urls?
    """
```

```
if not blocklist_parser:
    blocklist_parser = BlockListParser(blocklist)
```

```
filtered_domains = set()
for url in url_list:
    if is_tracker(url, first_party, blocklist_parser):
        filtered_domains.add(get_host_plus_ps(url))
```

```
return filtered_domains
```

Getting third-party responses from our data

```
tp_query = "SELECT r.url, h.value FROM http_responses_view AS r " \
"LEFT JOIN http_response_headers_view as h ON h.response_id = r.id " \
"WHERE r.top_url LIKE %s AND " \
"url not LIKE %s and h.name = 'Content-Type'"
```

```
cur = connection.cursor()
cur.itsize = 100000
try:
    top_ps = utils.get_host_plus_ps(url)
except AttributeError:
    print("Error while finding public suffix for %s" % top_url)
    return None

cur.execute(tp_query, (top_url, top_ps))
```

```
el_parser = BlockListParser('easylist.txt')
ep_parser = BlockListParser('easyprivacy.txt')
response_data = defaultdict(dict)
```

```
for url, content_type in cur:
    if utils.should_ignore(url):
        continue
```

```
url_data = dict()
```

```
url_ps = utils.get_host_plus_ps(url)
if url_ps == top_ps:
    continue
url_data['url_ps'] = url_ps
```

```
is_js = utils.is_js(url, content_type)
is_img = utils.is_img(url, content_type)
is_el_tracker = utils.is_tracker(url,
```

```
is_js=is_js,
is_img=is_img,
first_party=top_url,
blocklist_parser=el_parser)
is_ep_tracker = utils.is_tracker(url,
```

```
is_js=is_js,
is_img=is_img,
first_party=top_url,
blocklist_parser=ep_parser)
is_tracker = is_el_tracker or is_ep_tracker
```

```
url_data['is_js'] = is_js
url_data['is_img'] = is_img
url_data['is_tracker'] = is_tracker
response_data[url] = url_data
```

```
def get_host_plus_ps(url):
```

```
    """Strip the URL down to just a hostname+publicsuffix.
```

```
    If the provided url contains an IP address, the IP address is returned.
```

```
    hostname = urlparse(url).hostname
```

```
    try:
```

```
        ip_address = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
```

```
        return hostname
```

```
    except ValueError:
        return hostname + public_suffix(hostname)
```

```
        content_type):
        if content_type == 'script':
```

```
            if urlparse(url).hostname.lower() == 'js':
                return True
```

```
            return False
```

```
def is_img(url, content_type):
    if get_top_public_suffix(url) == 'image':
```

```
        return True
```

```
    extension = urlparse(url).hostname.lower()
    if extension in ['img', 'jpeg', 'png', 'gif', 'svg', 'webp']:
```

```
        return True
```

```
    return False
```

```
def filter_domains(url_list, first_party, blocklist_parser=None, blocklist="easylist.txt"):
    """Returns a set of domains that are identified as trackers from list of URLs.
```

```
Returns a set of domains/IPs filtered by the given blocklist_parser.
TODO: Better way to get a list of domains/IPs, or list of filtered urls.
"""
```

```
if not blocklist_parser:
    blocklist_parser = BlockListParser(blocklist)
```

```
filtered_domains = set()
```

```
for url in url_list:
```

```
    if is_tracker(url, first_party, blocklist_parser):
        filtered_domains.add(get_host_plus_ps(url))
```

```
return filtered_domains
```

Getting third-party responses with Census.py

```
census.get_third_party_responses_by_domain(  
    database_connection,  
    "http://nytimes.com"  
)
```


Getting third-party responses with Census.py

- `get_third_party_responses_by_domain`
- `get_third_party_responses_by_domain`
- `get_cookie_syncs_on_domain`
- `is_tracker`
- `get_trackers`

Getting third-party responses with Census.py

- `get_third_party_responses_by_domain`
- `get_third_party_responses_by_domain`
- `get_cookie_syncs_on_domain`
- `is_tracker`
- `get_trackers`

Contact us for access to
“alpha” analysis server
and library!

Thanks for listening!

Full Paper:

senglehardt.com/papers/ccs16_online_tracking.pdf

Data and Analysis:

webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/webcensus/

Collaborate:

webtap.princeton.edu/research/

Contact Me

Email: ste@cs.princeton.edu

Twitter: [@s_englehardt](https://twitter.com/s_englehardt)

Web: senglehardt.com

Image Assets from the Noun Project:
Browser Network and Browser Battery by Aybige

Detection and Circumvention of Anti Ad-Blockers: A New Arms Race on the Web

Zubair Shafiq (University of Iowa)
Zhiyun Qian (UC-Riverside)

This research was funded by the Data Transparency Lab (DTL)

NEW!
Tell Something About Your Company HERE!

PUT YOUR WONDERFUL CAMPAIGN TEXT HERE
to increase your sale

50% OFF

Plus a chance to win bonus prizes on the grand draw!

BIG EVENT WILL COME THIS NOVEMBER AND IT'S AWESOME

50% OFF
on selected items

the best offer of this year will come
AND GET A CHANCE TO WIN \$25,000 ON GRAND DRAW!

Corporate Banner Ad Campaign

YOUR COMPANY NAME
YOUR IMPORTANT CAMPAIGN TEXT HERE TO CATCH THEIR ATTENTION
[LEARN MORE](#)

YOUR COMPANY
some catchy words to attract the potential clients
FREE SIGN UP

HOT!
ONE BIG SUMMER SALE!
[LEARN MORE](#)

TELL SOMETHING ABOUT YOUR BUSINESS

yourcompany [LEARN MORE](#)

NEED A VACATION? experience it now!
swim, surf, dive, and more!
BOOK NOW!

Best Mobile Phone Deal
get it here first! limited units only.
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FREE SHIPPING!
AFFORDABLE [YOUR ITEM] shop now and get a chance to win gadgets!

YOUR COMPANY NAME
www.yourcompany.com

SOME MARKETING WORDS
we will increase your sales 20 times
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are you the *right one* that we're looking for?
WE WANT YOU!
yourLOGO [APPLY NOW](#)
www.yourcompany.com

YOUR LOGO

START YOUR CAREER in HEALTHCARE
[LEARN MORE](#)
www.yourwebsite.com

Tell Something About Your Business

you may put your powerful campaign text here
[Learn More](#)

High Conversion Banner Ad for Your Campaign


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Do Not Track



FCC



Privacy Preserving Tools

- EFF's Privacy Badger
 - Target publishers that do not respect DNT



- Ghostery
 - Proprietary



- Ad-block (**open-source, public filter lists**)
 - Adblock Plus
 - uBlock Origin



Popularity of Ad-blockers



But...

Here's The Thing With Ad Blockers

We get it: Ads aren't what you're here for. But ads help us keep the lights on. So, add us to your ad blocker's [whitelist](#) or pay \$1 per week for an ad-free version of WIRED. Either way, you are supporting our journalism. We'd really appreciate it.

Sign Up


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Project Goals

- Measure Anti Ad-blocking in the Wild
 - Number of anti ad-blocking publishers
 - Third-party anti ad-blocking services
 - Ad-block detection techniques
- Develop a Stealthy Ad-blocker
 - Automatically block anti ad-block scripts

Measuring Anti Ad-blockers

- Crawl Alexa top 100K websites
- A/B testing
 - with and without ad-block
- Feature extraction
 - nodes, attributes, text
- Machine learning models
 - Random forest, SVM, Bayesian
- Results
 - 95% precision, 93% recall
 - 1100 websites use anti ad-blockers



How Anti Ad-blockers Work?

Websites employ anti ad-block scripts

- Identify leaked extension information
- Verify ads (active or passive)

```
//step 1: set timeout
var myVar = setInterval(function() {
  myFunc()
}, 2000);

function myFunc() {

  // step 2: condition check
  if (window.iExist === undefined ||
    (!$("#XUinXYCfBvqpyDHOOrOAVClxoWJemrlPpfYCdWfiyAzNY").is(
      ":visible") && ($("#vip_052x003").height() < 100 && !$(
        "#vipchat").length) && ($("#vip_09x827").height() < 25))) {

    //step 3: response
    $("#XUinXYCfBvqpyDHOOrOAVClxoWJemrlPpfYCdWfiyAzNY").css(
      "width:100%;height:100%;position:fixed;z-index:999999;top:0");
    $("#XUinXYCfBvqpyDHOOrOAVClxoWJemrlPpfYCdWfiyAzNY").show();
  }
  else if ($("#XUinXYCfBvqpyDHOOrOAVClxoWJemrlPpfYCdWfiyAzNY").is(
    ":visible") && ($("#vip_052x003").height() > 249) {

    $("#XUinXYCfBvqpyDHOOrOAVClxoWJemrlPpfYCdWfiyAzNY").hide()
  }
}
```

Towards a Stealthy Ad-blocker

- Remove anti ad-block scripts through filter lists
- Crowd-sourced, manually populated



Takeaway

- Users, Society, Economics
- “Ad blocking is like garlic. You hang it on your door to keep Dracula away from sucking your blood. Ad blocking is not the enemy. Just stop being Dracula.”
 - Doc Searls

Discussion of Session 4

Presenters:

- **James C. Cooper**, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University
- **Steven Englehardt**, Princeton University
- **Zubair Shafiq**, University of Iowa

Moderator:

- **Kristin Cohen**, Federal Trade Commission

BREAK



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