PUBLIC

Closing Statement

Federal Trade Commission & State of Idaho v. St. Luke's Health System, Ltd. & Saltzer Medical Group, P.A.





The Acquisition Substantially Lessens Competition



- Substantially increases concentration in a highly concentrated market, creating a strong presumption of anticompetitive effects
- Enhances market power by combining the two largest providers of Adult PCP Services in Nampa, eliminating each provider's closest competitor
- Documents, testimony, and economic analysis confirm that the Acquisition will increase healthcare costs to Idaho consumers

Defendants' Claimed Efficiencies Are Speculative and Not Merger-Specific




The Acquisition is **neither necessary nor sufficient** for St. Luke's or Saltzer to achieve higher quality, lower cost care:

- Employment of physicians is not a superior organizational model to other affiliation strategies
- Benefits of St Luke's Health IT tools are speculative, and Saltzer would have access to such tools if it remained independent
- St. Luke's and Saltzer can engage in risk-based contracting without the Acquisition
- Defendants' "core" theory is unsupported
- No evidence that St. Luke's prior acquisitions of physician groups have resulted in higher quality or lower cost care

Bargaining Leverage Overview



- Bargaining Leverage: Health Plans vs. Providers
 - Health plans and providers determine rates through bilateral negotiations
 - Each side's leverage is determined by the other side's "outside option"
- Health plans then market their networks to employers and patients
 - Patients choose among in-network providers and are generally not sensitive to small differences in price
- The Acquisition makes heath plans' outside options much less attractive, giving St. Luke's/Saltzer the ability to extract higher reimbursements from health plans



Plaintiffs Have Met Their Prima Facie Burden

The Acquisition will substantially lessen competition



Plaintiffs Have Met Their *Prima Facie* Burden




- Plaintiffs have conclusively established:
 - The relevant product market is Adult PCP services
 - The relevant geographic market is Nampa
 - Market shares and HHIs for Nampa—as well as much larger geographic markets—exceed thresholds for presumptive illegality by a wide margin
- In addition, documents, testimony, and empirical data confirm the Acquisition's likely competitive harm

Section 7 of the Clayton Act



"No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly ... the assets of one or more persons engaged in commerce ... where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition ... may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."

Philadelphia Nat'l Bank Presumption Governs Merger Analysis



Defendants Ask the Court to Disregard Established Law



- Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent
 - United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 377 U.S. 321, 363 (1963)
 - California v. Am. Stores Co., 872 F.2d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 1989)
- Recent healthcare merger cases
 - FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1079-80 (N.D. III. 2012)
 - FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., No. 11-cv-47, 2011 WL 1219281, at *56 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011)
- Cases cited by Defendants
 - United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990) (Defs.' Pretrial Mem. at 4)

Defendants Ask the Court to Disregard Established Law



- "Statistics that indicate excessive post-merger market share and market concentration create a presumption that the merger violates the Clayton Act."
 - California v. Am. Stores Co., 872 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1989)
- "Sufficiently large HHI figures establish the FTC's prima facie case that a merger is anticompetitive."
 - FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

The Relevant Markets

The relevant markets have been conclusively established



Relevant Product Market is Undisputed



 No dispute that Adult PCP Services is a distinct service market, even though some patients visit other specialists to receive primary care (*e.g.*, OB/GYN, cardiologists, pulmonologists)

Nampa is the Relevant Geographic Market



A hypothetical monopolist of all Adult PCPs in Nampa could profitably impose a small but significant non-transitory price increase ("SSNIP") – i.e., 5-10%

- Multiple, consistent points of support for Nampa as a relevant geographic market
 - **Undisputed** evidence from broad range of market participants that patients prefer local access to primary care physicians
 - Every health plan, including St. Luke's health plan partner, recognizes the importance of including Nampa PCPs in-network
 - Claims data reveal strong patient preference for local PCPs and a clear bifurcation between Nampa and other areas of the Treasure Valley, especially Ada County
 - All major health plans have PCPs very close to where their members live

There is No Dispute That Patients Demand PCP Access Close to Home



 "I'm sure it's true that patients like to receive primary care services in a convenient location. Many patients want to receive their services close to home"

- Dr. David Argue, Defendants' economic expert

 Providing services close to patients' homes is a "patient-centered approach"

- John Kee, St. Luke's Vice President of Physician Services

 "[Y]ou want your primary care clinic so that it's convenient for your patients . . . If they have to take a child out of school . . . [they] don't want to spend their entire day trying to get to a physician's office"

- Nancy Powell, Former Saltzer CFO

Patients Demand Access to Nampa PCPs



FTC, et al. v. St. Luke's Health System DEFS' OBJ FDN/FORM

> locations that can act to start to help and collaborate and coordinate that Q. Do patients in, for example prefer to see primary care physici. located in Nampa" MR. SCHAFER: Object to form Also, outside the scope of the 30(b)(You can answer from your p perspective. THE WITNESS: From Iwould Q. BY MR. PERRY: I want t 13 I want to understand the -- the reat 14 St. Luke's believes that it needs a s 15 number of acquired physician pra-16 the communities that it serves. 17 Do you understand that? 18 A. Oksy. 19 Q. For purposes of that quest 20 believe is within the scope of the St. Luke's has designated you to trying to understand why St. L. acquire additional physician p and in Caldwell when it alread of physician practices that

> > Meridian, Eagle, in 2 A. So, generally ee physicians in the if at all possible. P talking about prim necessarily want avel 30 or 40 mil a primary care p lician. They would like see a physician in their immediate vicinity, articularly when we're talking about primary We feel that we need to have an affiliated group of primary care physicians in our respective regions to be able to provide that collaborative and care coordination efforts. Therefore, the Saltzer Medical Group would be able to do that. And if they were

financially aligned, we would be able to integrate them into the system to help improve care coordination, access to care, and quality -quality initiatives that we're implementing. Q. Let me turn you back to Plaintiffs'

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Exhibit 386 and turn to page 10. The bottom paragraph on page 10 states, "Significantly, a health care system cannot achieve the well-recognized benefit: of integration if it doe:

Q. I'm trying to understand why St. Luke's needs to acquire additional physician practices in Nampa and in Caldwell when it already employs a number of physician practices that are in Boise, Meridian, Eagle, in Ada County?

A. [P]atients would like to see physicians in their immediate vicinity . . . Patients don't want to travel 30 or 40 miles to see a primary care physician.

way - strike that. It is 5t. Luke's position it is necessary to acquire a significant number or a nucleus of primary care physicians in the Nampa'Caldwell area to achieve the benefits described in Plaintiff': Exhibit **30**⁴⁶ ¹³⁰ A. I think it is our position that we need physicians that are aligned with the strategic goals of the organization to improve

care coordination, improve access, improve quality, and decrease costs. We need those physicians to be aligned. In many cases, for that alignment to

occur, they need -- they would benefit from being financially integrated. There are many things that we can provide a group that's financially integrated that we can't provide if they are not financially integrated simply because of the cost

6 (Pages 21 to 24)

Dr. Kurt Seppi, Executive Medical Director

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
Health Plans and St. Luke's Agree: Networks Need Nampa PCPs

Attorneys' Eyes Only



Health Plan Networks Include Adult PCPs In Virtually Every Zip Code

Percentage of population with access to in-network PCPs in their home zip codes




TX 1782 (Dranove Report), Figure 11 (Presence of in-network PCPs in Treasure Valley zip codes for three largest health plans)

St. Luke's Own Documents Analyze the "Nampa Physician Market"

Specialty	Saltzer	SLHS Practices Mercy Group	St. Al's	PHMG	Independent	Total	Potential SLHS	% of Total
amily Practice	11	7	14	2	4	38	Practices 18	47%
ernal Medicine	6	0	0	0	4	10	6	60%
diatrics	11	0	0	0	1	12	11	92%
	1	0	0	0	7	8	1	13%
neral Surgery	2	0	1	0	1	4	2	50%
thopedics	4	0	0	0	0	4	4	100%
т	1	0	0	0	1	2	1	50%
		Group ovider			a.	sent	the m	ajorit

Dr. Argue's Reliance on Outflow Percentages Leads to Absurd Results






Dr. Argue's criticism of the Nampa market applies equally to his own proposed market of "at least" Nampa/Caldwell/Meridian/West Boise

TX 2396 (Argue Report) Exhibit 13, Trial Tr. at 1331-35 (David Dranove)

Dr. Argue Did Not Perform a Complete Critical Loss Analysis



- As described in the *Horizontal Merger Guidelines*, must compare the critical loss with the **actual loss**
- Dr. Argue only calculated critical loss, not the actual loss
- Without an estimate for the actual loss, critical loss is "just a number"



Dr. Argue's revised *critical loss* estimate for a 5% price increase Dr. Argue's estimated actual loss for a 5% price increase

Additional Flaws in Dr. Argue's Critical Loss Analysis



- No evidence that a significant percentage of patients would switch providers in response to a small price increase
 - Economic research and practical experience show that patients rarely choose providers based on price
 - Dr. Argue agrees: only a small fraction of patients are price sensitive (e.g., 10%), meaning a very high percentage (i.e., 88% of 10%) would have to switch providers to exceed the critical loss
 - According to Dr. Argue's Deloitte study, *less than 1 percent* of patients switched providers because of price
- "Multiplier effect" theory contradicts sworn testimony on referrals from Defendants' own witnesses

Argue's "Multiplier Effect"

- This theory contradicts sworn testimony from multiple defense witnesses that St. Luke's does not direct referrals
- Ignores the way prices are determined in health care markets
 - Prices are determined through negotiations between payers and providers
 - For all the reasons Professor Dranove explained (insurance, price opacity, decision-making under duress), pricing discipline does not come from patients
- Reinforces that Dr. Argue's critical loss analysis is inappropriate to analyze healthcare markets and is therefore not a reliable way to predict the likely competitive effects

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Market Concentration

Market shares and HHIs exceed thresholds for presumptive illegality by a wide margin




Courts Routinely Apply the Merger Guidelines Concentration Thresholds



"Sufficiently large HHI figures establish the government's prima facie case that a merger is anticompetitive. Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, markets with an HHI above 2500 are considered 'highly concentrated' and mergers 'resulting in highly concentrated markets that involve an increase in the HHI of more than 200 points will be presumed to be likely to enhance market power."

United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 71-72 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Horizontal Merger Guidelines, § 5.3). See also, e.g., California v. Am. Stores Co., 872 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1989); FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1211 n.12 (11th Cir. 1991); FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1079-80 (N. D. III. 2012)

St. Luke's and Saltzer Account For Nearly 80% of PCP Services In Nampa



Market shares for Adult PCP Services in Nampa


TX 1789 (Dranove Report), Figure 18

HHIs Exceed Presumptively Illegal Thresholds by a Wide Margin

Group	Visits	Pre-merger visits share	Post-merger visits share	Delta HHI
Saltzer	6,087	65.5%	77.7%	
St. Luke's	1,142	12.3%	11.1%	
Saint Alphonsus	1,113	12.0%	12.0%	
Primary Health	451	4.8%	4.8%	+1,607
Terry Reilly	88	0.9%	0.9%	
All Others	419	4.5%	4.5%	
HHIs		4,612	6,219	


 The merger results in HHI of 6,219 with an increase of 1,607 points (i.e., more than double and eight times presumptively illegal thresholds, respectively)

Even in Much Broader Markets, the Acquisition is Presumptively Illegal




 In Nampa/Caldwell, the merger results in HHI of 4,150 with an increase of 900 points (i.e., 1.5 times and four times presumptively illegal thresholds, respectively)

Even in Much Broader Markets, the Acquisition is Presumptively Illegal



 In Nampa/Caldwell/Meridian, the merger results in HHI of 3,606 with an increase of 1,437 points (i.e., nearly 1.5 times and seven times the presumptively illegal thresholds, respectively)

Post-Merger HHIs Here Far Exceed Other Transactions Found Unlawful



Anticompetitive Effects

Evidence confirms the Acquisition's likely competitive harm



Evidence Confirms Likely Anticompetitive Harm



- As Defendants' ordinary-course documents predict, the Acquisition will enhance St. Luke's and Saltzer's negotiating leverage
- Increased bargaining leverage can raise reimbursements for any of the negotiated services (the "bottom right-hand cell")
- Employer testimony illustrates how the Acquisition will increase healthcare costs
- Diversion analysis reinforces evidence of likely anticompetitive effects


St. Luke's Agrees PCP Market Share Gives "Strong Position" with Payers



Primary Care Physician Market Share St. Luke's Treasure Valley recognizes that market share in primary care is a key success factor, critical to sustaining a strong position relative to payer contracting and supporting ancillary, procedural, inpatient, specialty and other services. For purposes of this analysis, primary care is defined as family medicine, internal medicine, OB/GVN and

Primary Care Physician Market Share

St. Luke's Treasure Valley recognizes that market share in primary care is a key success factor, critical to sustaining a strong position relative to payer contracting and supporting ancillary, procedural, inpatient, specialty and other services. For purposes of this analysis, primary care is defined as family medicine, internal medicine, OB/GYN and pediatrics.




Saltzer's Consultant Predicted the Deal Would Increase Negotiating Leverage

Attorneys' Eyes Only

The Acquisition Will Augment Negotiating "Clout" With Health Plans





that might be. If our negotiations w/ Luke's go to fruition, this will be something we could try to get back, ie consult codes, as there would be the clout of the entire network. rp

Prom: Stark A, Rasmus Sent: Triday, Juni 22, 2011 L01 (M Ton Namo Rowell Oc: Randell Page: John Kaser Subject: Blue Cross consultations		
I'm assuming that they'ris not paying at the xame rates as they would if they were "cons patient" visits? Were we aware of this when renegotiating our most recent contract with blow for some of us. Does this include all of Blue Cross or just Blue Cross of Idaho? Mark		Ra
From: Stephanie Herman Sent: Trotov, Agni 22, 2011 12-201 PM Toc Physicians; Mid-Levels; Jeanie Cronnath; Kency Powel; Deanne Walker; Toni Wright; Letcher Cic Tami NcGee; Dorothy B. Smith; Julie Sullivan; Katherine R. Petrson; Kathy Barton; K Samantia A. Booth; Taffy J. Hewley Subjects		
Good Morning There has been a change in how we are billing consults for Blue Cross Blue Cross is no longer going to accept consult codes. This means that Medicare guidelines. So if a patient is sent to you for an office consul patient you will need to bill the 99201-99205 level CPT codes. If the pu you will need to bill out the 99212-99215 level CPT codes. If the consult	they are following t and they are a new atient is established then	61/4
CONFIDENTIAL	SMG000315458	
	Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1361	

Randell Page, Chairman, Saltzer Contracts Committee Attorneys' Eyes Only

Sees St. Luke's as a Attorneys' Eyes Only



Attorneys' Eyes Only

Attorneys' Eyes Only

Diversion Analysis Confirms Likely Anticompetitive Effects



- St. Luke's and Saltzer are each other's closest competitors for PCP services in Nampa
 - Honda/Toyota vs. Honda/BMW
- The Acquisition increases negotiating leverage by eliminating close substitutes
 - St. Luke's and Saltzer can force large share of patients into their third choice
 - E.g., if the combined firm is excluded from the network, 50% of St. Luke's Nampa patients would be forced to use their third choice

Reinforces likely anticompetitive effects

 Rebuts Defendants' claim that market shares and HHIs do not accurately reflect the market and is not sensitive to geographic market

Defendants' Rebuttal Case

Defendants fail to rebut the strong presumption of illegality



Entry and Expansion

The merger's likely anticompetitive effects will not be offset by entry or expansion



Entry and Expansion Must Be Timely, Likely, and Sufficient



<u>Timely</u>

"It would take significantly longer than the **two-year timeframe prescribed by the Merger Guidelines** to plan, obtain zoning, licensing, and regulatory permits, and construct a new hospital in [the geographic market]."

<u>Likely</u>

"The Merger Guidelines explain that **for entry to be considered likely, it must be a profitable endeavor**, in light of the associated costs and risks."

<u>Sufficient</u>

"Under the Merger Guidelines, for entry or expansion to be sufficient, it must replace at least the scale and strength of one of the merging firms in order to replace the lost competition from the Acquisition."

FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., No. 11-cv-47, 2011 WL 1219281, at **31-34 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011) (emphasis added)

Expansion and Entry Will Not Offset Acquisition's Anticompetitive Effects



- Difficult for existing in-network PCPs to expand their practices by cutting price
- Saint Al's has had little success expanding its Nampa PCP presence
- The need for an established reputation makes new entry unlikely and expansion difficult
 - No de novo entry in Nampa in years
 - Primary Health considers hiring one doctor per year a "tremendous success"

Dkt. No. 363 (Reinhardt Dep. Tr.) at 47; Trial Tr. at 713-15 (Nancy Powell), 1191, 1221 (David Peterman), 1360-61 (David Dranove)

Efficiencies

Defendants' efficiencies claims are speculative and not merger-specific



Defendants Fail to Demonstrate "Extraordinary" Efficiencies



- "No court . . . has found efficiencies sufficient to rescue an otherwise illegal merger."
 - FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., No. 3:11 cv 47, 2011 WL
 1219281, at *57 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 29, 2011)
- "High market concentration levels require proof of extraordinary efficiencies, ... and courts generally have found inadequate proof of efficiencies to sustain a rebuttal of the government's case."
 - United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 89 (D.D.C. 2011); FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 721-22 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Horizontal Merger Guidelines, § 10

Efficiencies

Defendants' efficiencies claims are speculative



Defendants' Claimed Efficiencies Must Be Verifiable



"The court must undertake a **rigorous analysis** ... to ensure that those **'efficiencies' represent more than mere speculation and promises**"

United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 89 (D.D.C. 2011); see also FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991); FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1088-89 (N.D. III. 2012)

"Delayed benefits . . . are less proximate and more difficult to predict," and thus are entitled to little weight.

- FTC v. CCC Holdings, Inc., 605 F.Supp 2d 26, 73 (D.D.C 2009); see also Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10

Purported Efficiencies Are Speculative




- St. Luke's and Saltzer executives and their expert agree that it is uncertain whether St Luke's will provide integrated patient care in the next few years
- Despite a lengthy track record of acquiring physician practices, St. Luke's failed to demonstrate cost savings or other benefits from its prior acquisitions
- Ordinary course documents confirm that motivation for Acquisition was not quality or cost savings
- Defendants' "core" theory is unsupported

St. Luke's VP of Clinical Integration: Claimed Efficiencies Are Speculative



Attorneys' Eyes Only

Attorneys' Eyes Only



Physician Employment Is Not a Panacea



- Employment of physicians has not been shown to be a superior organizational form for achieving integrated patient care
- Defendants' view is unsupported by empirical evidence
- The presence of certain organizational functionalities—not a specific organizational structure or form—are essential to integrate patient care

St. Luke's Past Acquisitions Have Not Generated Any Cost Savings



Experiment: A systematic, empirical analysis of the effects of St. Luke's past acquisitions of PCP groups

Methodology: "Difference-in-differences"

 Compare changes in overall healthcare spending for patients in two groups


<u>Unrebutted Findings</u>: *No evidence* of systematic reductions in healthcare costs following St. Luke's past acquisitions of PCP groups

- Indeed, results suggest that St. Luke's past PCP acquisitions may have resulted in *increased* healthcare spending
- Defendants' experts have made no attempt to measure efficiencies from prior acquisitions and have offered no contrary analysis at trial


The Saltzer PSA Reinforces Fee-for-Service Incentives




(a) <u>wRVU Compensation</u>. St. Luke's shall pay an amount to Saltzer per work RVU ("wRVU") generated by Saltzer physicians as indicated in Attachment A to this Exhibit 5.1.



7.1 Independent Contractors. St. Luke's hereby engages Saltzer as an independent contractor to render Services through Saltzer Physicians, and Saltzer hereby accepts such engagement. St. Luke's will not impose duties or constraints of any kind which would require Saltzer Physicians to infringe the ethics of the medical profession or which would compromise the independence of Saltzer Physicians' medical judgment. It is understood and agreed that in the performance of all Services under this Agreement, Saltzer and Saltzer Physicians shall at all times act as independent contractors of St. Luke's and the same are not agents or employees of St. Luke's for any purpose. Further, it is expressly understood and agreed by the Parties that nothing contained



Defendants' "Core" Theory Is Inconsistent and Unsupported



"[W]hat's the basis for it [the number of core physicians needed]? And all I can say is it's a judgment out of unsupported opinion" - Prof. Alain Enthoven, Defendants' Efficiencies Expert

Dkt. No. 371 (Seppi Dep. Tr. at 17); Trial Tr. at 1691-92 (David Pate), 2642, 2661, 2737 (Alain Enthoven)

Efficiencies

Defendants' efficiencies claims are not merger specific



Defendants' Claimed Efficiencies Must Be Merger-Specific



"[E]fficiencies must be 'merger-specific' to be cognizable as a defense."

 FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 721-22 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 89; FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., No. 11-cv-47, 2011 WL 1219281, at **39-41 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011).

Defendant's Efficiencies Are Not Merger-Specific



The Acquisition is not necessary:


- For Saltzer or St. Luke's to provide integrated patient care i.e., higher quality, lower cost care
- For Saltzer or St. Luke's to transition away from fee-for-service payments to risk-based contracting
- For Saltzer to fully utilize and gain the purported benefits of St. Luke's health IT tools, including Epic and WhiteCloud

The Acquisition Is Not Necessary for Saltzer to Work with St. Luke's

2003


I believe I've said if this is unwound, we would try to find opportunities to work with Saltzer. They have been a good community partner.

2002



St. Luke's indicated to Saltzer that even if the transaction didn't work out, St. Luke's was still committed to working with Saltzer in whatever ways could be beneficial.

2862



2863

Trial Tr. at 2005 (John Kee), 2862 (Randell Page)

St. Luke's Could Reward Independent Physicians for Quality Care



Defendants assert that the Acquisition is necessary to engage in pay-for-performance contracts with the Saltzer physicians, *BUT*:

- Commercial health plans across the United States are building pay-for-performance into independent physician contracts
- Other health systems—e.g., Advocate Health System engage in pay-for-performance contracts with independent physicians
- Saint Al's has had pay-for-performance contracts with independent physicians since 2004 that paid independents a bonus dependent on achieving patient satisfaction, cost, and quality metrics

Defendants Can Engage in Risk-Based Contracting Without the Deal



- An independent Saltzer could engage in risk-based contracting
 - Saltzer would participate in St. Luke's risk-based relationship with SelectHealth through its membership in BrightPath
 - BCI has risk-based contracts with small independent physician groups (e.g., two physicians)
- St. Luke's plans to develop risk-based products do not depend on acquiring Saltzer
 - Patricia Richards of SelectHealth could not identify "any significant benefits from having Saltzer be directly affiliated and highly integrated with St. Luke's"
 - Dr. Argue admitted that St. Luke's could pursue risk-based contracting without Saltzer

Independent Physicians Can Fulfill the "Triple Aim"



- According to St. Luke's CEO, David Pate, Primary Health is "well on its way to fulfilling the Triple Aim"
- Primary Health is achieving the Triple Aim with its eClinicalWorks-based health IT infrastructure
 - Engages in population health management
 - Performs quality scoring and health data analytics (e.g., diabetes care)
 - Engages in evidence-based medicine
 - Shares EMR data with St. Luke's and Saint Al's
 - Achieved meaningful use status under federal regulations

Saltzer Could Adopt or Interoperate with Epic if it Remained Independent



St. Luke's Affiliate EMR Program

 An independent physician participating in the Affiliate EMR program would be utilizing the Epic system in exactly the same ways as an employed St. Luke's Clinic physician

- Dr. Marc Chasin, St. Luke's Chief Information Officer

 When the Affiliate EMR program is up and running, independent groups will be as clinically aligned as employed groups

- Chris Roth, St. Luke's Regional Medical Center CEO

Idaho Health Data Exchange

• Costs less than \$200 per month and interface is easy to use

- Dr. Marc Chasin, St. Luke's Chief Information Officer

 IHDE "enables cross region interoperability between Epic and non-Epic health record systems"

- St. Luke's ordinary course document

Purported WhiteCloud Benefits Are Achievable Without the Acquisition



- WhiteCloud can be used by independent physicians
 - WhiteCloud currently is pulling data from Saltzer's eClinicalWorks EMR
 - St. Luke's plans to use WhiteCloud with the independent providers in Select Medical Network and its ACO
- An independent Saltzer would have access to widely used and proven data analytics tools
 - Saint Al's plans to roll out the Explorys data analytics tool to all members of the Health Alliance in December 2013

Other "Defenses"

Defendants' other novel efficiency "defenses" do not overcome the Acquisition's anticompetitive effects



Novel Defenses Do Not Justify an Anticompetitive Acquisition



- Regulations implementing the Affordable Care Act encourage competition as a way to promote higher quality, lower cost care
- Other independent physician groups in Nampa treat Medicaid patients
- Evolving healthcare marketplace warrants continued scrutiny of provider mergers

The "Healthcare Reform" Defense Is **Contradicted by Affordable Care Act**



Competition among ACOs can accelerate advancements in quality and efficiency. All of these benefits to Medicare patients would be reduced or eliminated if we were to allow ACOs to participate in the **Shared Savings Program when their** formation and participation would create market power.

> requirement would apply to any newly formed ACO with a PSA share above 50 percent for any common service that wo or more ACO participants provide to patients from the same PSA, and that did not enalify for the rural exception articulated in the proposed Antitrust Policy Statement. Those ACOs would be required to submit to us, as part of their Shared Savings Program applications, a lotter from the reviewing Antitrust Agency confirming that it had no present intent to challenge or recommend challenging the proposed ACO. Absent such a letter, the proposed ACO would not be eligible to participate in the Shared Savings Program. In addition, the proposed Antitrust Policy Statement explained that ACOs that are outside the safety zone and below the 50 percent mandatory review hreshold frequently may be pro-

mber 2, 2011/Rules and Regula thereby potentially increased five types of incentives to provide care enrollees of higher-pavir rather than for Medicare b ne lo hoe We stated that competi marketplace benefits Medi Shared Savings Program b romotes quality of care for eficiaries and protec

commenters opposed mand of ACOs, because an ACO is ness model designed t laboration and coordin rule) in hile still providing ben reedom of choice of provi FFS Medicare. The co ACO mu following points:
 The Social Security A nded by the Affordable does not authorize us eith nts from th normalisticana menore Antitrust Agencies the a ACO would block participation in the lavings Program by certa view or rencies. If th aters cited at ng that the pro er from the review confers unreviewa on the Antitrost Agenci ig the ACO, we entities from particit Savings Program and th the subdelegation doctrin • It is had public policy We explained in the proposed rule nature of antitrust enfo enforcement to a regula requiring a mandatory r that the purpose of requiring Antitrust Agency confirmation that it had no esent intent to challenge or commend challenging the ACO as a policants with PSA sh percent for common condition of narticipation is two-fold The mandatory revi

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D would be

First, it would ensure that ACOs

participating in the Shared Savings

Program would not present competit problems that could subject them to

greement with us. Second, it would

potential for the creation of ACOs with

reduce the quality of care furnished to neficiaries and/or to raise

nmercial health plans and enrolled

prices or reduce the quality for

narket power. In this context market ower refers to the ability of an ACO to

Medicare b

Medicare be

titrust challenge that may prevent em from completing the term of their

intain competition for the benefit of dicare beneficiaries by reducing the


hared Savings

es tha

modified such that an ACO not its size, should be mon because if an ACO produce while maintain centeredness, market sh ropriate measure of a

 Require mandatory PSA shares, but do not re PSA share to obtain a m

"Nichard D. Raskin, Bon J. Kutth, & Bronna E. tedicare ACDs to Undergo Pro-Clearance o tedicare ACDs to Undergo Pro-Clearance o




Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program; Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802, 67841 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425)

Independent Nampa Physicians Treat Medicare/Medicaid Patients



- Q. And there are *many physician groups* that treat Medicaid patients in the Nampa area that aren't affiliated with a hospital; correct?
- A. Correct.
- Q. You mentioned, I think when Mr. Bierig was asking you questions, something about access by Medicaid patients in Nampa. At present, are there any access issues for Medicaid patients in the Nampa area?
- A. We are not aware of access problems in that area.



Trial Tr. at 2290 (Director Armstrong)

Policy Experts Support Continued Scrutiny of Healthcare Mergers



"Enhance the current antitrust enforcement practice of imposing higher standards and greater scrutiny for mergers relative to clinical/financial integration contracts."

BENDING THE CURVE

ENGELBERG CENTER for Health Care Refor

REPORTINGS

Person-Centered Health Care Reform: A Framework for Improving Care and Slowing Health Care Cost Growth



This project was supported by

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ENGELBERG CENTER FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, BENDING THE CURVE 31 (2013).

Conclusion

The Acquisition is unlawful



Conclusion



- Post-merger HHI of 6,219 creates a strong legal presumption that this merger will have anticompetitive consequences
- Testimony, documents, and empirical evidence confirm the Acquisition's likely anticompetitive effects
- There are no verifiable, merger-specific efficiencies that justify taking the risk of this Acquisition

Remedy

Divestiture is the appropriate remedy



Divestiture is Appropriate



 Divestiture is the "most suitable remedy in a suit for relief from a § 7 violation"

California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 284 (1990)

- Divestiture "should always be in the forefront of a court's mind when a violation of § 7 has been found" Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 1368, 1380 (9 th Cir. 1978)
- Defendants do not quote this language from *Gabaret*:


"Of course, none of these concerns [about divestiture] is dispositive" in a suit by a government plaintiff

Garabet v. Autonomous Tech. Corp., 116 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2000)

Defendants' "Remedy" is Illusory

- St. Luke's-Saltzer is not *Evanston*
 - No merger-specific benefits have been achieved
 - Eggs not scrambled
- By promising that they could unwind, defendants promised that *Evanston* remedy would not apply
- According to defendants' own purported justification for the deal, their remedy would soon be inconsequential
- Requires monitoring and oversight
- Defendants' remedy does not incentivize competitive behavior

"Two Negotiating Teams" – At Most An Intramural Scrimmage



What Lisa Ahern Did <u>Not</u> Say

- Saltzer will go under
- Saltzer will not be profitable
- Saltzer doctors will not practice in Nampa
- Saltzer doctors will have to leave Nampa
- Saltzer doctors will not be able to increase their compensation over time
- Saltzer will not be able to compete
- All defendants' expert really said was . . .

... Saltzer doctors will make less money next year

"Weak Company" is a Weak Argument

- Never adopted by any court
- "Weakest ground of all" to justify a merger
- "[A] 'weak company' defense would expand the failing company defense, a defense which has strict limits." *FTC v. Warner Commc'ns, 742 F.2d 1156, 1164 (9th Cir. 1984)*
- "History records and common sense indicate that the creation of monopoly and the loss of competition involve the acquisition of the small and the weak by the big and the strong."

Kaiser Aluminum v. FTC, 652 F.2d 1324, 1341 (7th Cir. 1981)

The Law on Economic Hardship



"[T]he Government cannot be denied [divestiture] because economic hardship, *however severe*, may result....This proposition is not novel; it is deeply rooted in antitrust law and has never been successfully challenged."

United States v. E.I. du Pont De Demours and Co., 366 U.S. 316, 327 (1961) (emphasis added)