

# Hearing #10 on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century

**Federal Trade Commission**

Constitution Center


March 20, 2019



# Welcome

# We Will Be Starting

# Shortly



# Welcome

**Ruth Yodaiken**

Federal Trade Commission  
Office of Policy Planning



# Introductory Remarks

**Alden Abbott**

Federal Trade Commission  
Office of General Counsel




# Technological Developments in Broadband Networking

## Evolution of Broadband Networking: 2008 to 2018

**kc claffy**

University of California, San Diego  
Center for Applied Internet  
Data Analysis



# Outline

- Technology primer: traffic, topology, transit
- Evolution: platforms, interconnection, complexity
- Implications: competition, potential harms
- Technology attempts to measure/mitigate potential harms
- What's different this decade?



# Aim to address this question


- Which (recent and expected) technological developments, or lack thereof, are important for understanding the competitiveness of the industry or impacts on the public interest?




# Global public IP platform

Traffic routed across global Internet platform, i.e., devices reachable via an IP address.

*Anyone (two) can interconnect!*




*Layered “hourglass” protocol architecture of TCP/IP Internet*






# Internet interconnection

- IP addresses grouped (on routers and) into networks
- Organized by Autonomous Systems (ASes)
- 70K+ ASes independently interconnect to form global Internet




# Internet transport (simplified)

Traffic flows through **transit providers** between **access** and **content** providers



# Early (90s) AS interconnection hierarchy

One can conceptualize interconnection structure based on (inferred) money flows.




customer  $\xrightarrow{\text{\$}}$  provider  
customer pays provider to transit their traffic

peer  $\xrightarrow{\text{\$}}$  peer  
peers do not pay to accept each other's traffic (assumed symmetric traffic flow)



IX(P): neutral facility for traffic exchange (was "point")

# Internet routing (simplified)


- Each router **locally optimizes** choice of next hop along path
- Applies network operator's routing policy to known topology; computes & propagates best paths
- Network operators balance: cost, performance, path length
- Often results in asymmetric routes
- Many edge networks (blue) only have *default route*, to transit provider



# 2010s: Content moves closer to consumer




Optimizes performance, reliability, availability cost



In face of relentless growth in demand (mostly video)


# Consolidation in content distribution

- While there continue to be small local content providers (UCSD), most traffic now handled by a few giant content providers (Google) or content distribution networks (Akamai)
- CDN business: transiting traffic from point where it enters CDN platform to an exit near consumer. At low cost.
- Key driver: Internet eating TV, gaming




# Content distribution strategies

Large companies may combine all three strategies.



# Does not reduce complexity..



“death of transit”?


Dense Interconnection

Hard to measure






# Internet platform layers



Allows the integration of multiple technologies below the platform and support of multiple services above it. (whole idea of IP..)

Can serve as internal or industry platform





# Dueling definitions

- **Online platform:** An online marketplace that places one party in touch with another, such as buyers and sellers. E.g., eBay, Craigslist, Amaz Mktplce, Airbnb, app store
  - Emphasis—multisided
- **Online platform:** a group of technologies that are used as a base upon which other apps or technologies are developed. E.g., IP, iOS, Android, AWS
  - Emphasis—programmable, service component, generality




# Growing: Cloud Service Platforms

- Externalizing internal industry platform
- New platform layer through which to distribute content and services
- Provide service replication and distribution
- Many web applications/services now first built upon “Internet giants” cloud service platforms



# Interconnection *across* platform layers



# Implications of cross-platform-layer interconnection dynamics for competition

Smaller ISPs have less opportunity to interconnect with BigContent

- Must access content providers via exchange points (85%)
- Less likely to vertically integrate themselves
- Cannot leverage transit and content cost savings
  - Particularly hard in rural areas, with 10-40X buildout cost
- Cannot give customers a better experience in accessing content like with video programming...

American Cable Association (smaller ISPs) survey:

[https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public\\_comments/2018/08/ftc-2018-0049-d-1623-155196.pdf](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/08/ftc-2018-0049-d-1623-155196.pdf)



# Potential Interconnection Harms

- Carrier and third-party services on top of single-firm IP platform can compete with third-party services running over “common” Internet.
- Interconnection points enable exercise of market power
  - Technical discrimination of traffic across the link.
    - Selective dropping or rate limiting
  - Inadequate capacity leading to impaired QoE
  - Discriminatory pricing or business terms (more likely?..)



# These are not new concerns

*“Principally, ... concern about the following issues:*

- ***blockage, degradation, and discrimination of content/apps***
- *vertical integration*
- *effects on innovation at edges*
- *lack of "last-mile" access competition*
- *legal and regulatory uncertainty*
- *diminution of political and other expression on the Internet”*

Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy, FTC Staff Report, 2007, p.5.

<https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/broadband-connectivity-competition-policy/v070000report.pdf>

See also: [http://www.cybertelecom.org/notes/cc\\_history.htm](http://www.cybertelecom.org/notes/cc_history.htm)



# Technology Approach Tried in 2015

- **Measure** the key characteristics of interconnection links.
  - Or mandate the reporting of those parameters
  - FCC used this approach in ATT/DirecTV merger
  - Outsourced to “Independent Measurement Expert”
- That approach begs many questions:
  - Is measuring individual links actually the right approach?
  - How does one measure the key characteristics of a link?
  - How well does that map to consumer harm?
  - Note: no agreed methods to measure QoE!





# These are “Complex Empirical Questions”

“The balance between competing incentives on the part of *broadband providers* to engage in, and the potential benefits and harms from, discrimination and differentiation in the *broadband* area raise **complex empirical questions** and may call for substantial additional study of the market generally, of local markets, or of particular transactions. Again, **further evidence of particular conduct would be useful** for assessing both the likelihood and severity of any potential harm from such conduct.”

FTC’s “Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy”, 2007

<https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/broadband-connectivity-competition-policy>



# Technology to detect harmful discrimination

- Not clear what FCC learned from AT&T reporting exercise
- Several other approaches to interconnection measurement
  - Each provides a part of a very complex picture
  - Need objective perspective to integrate and cross-validate
- No silver measurement bullet
- Limited ability for academics to sustain this kind of work
  - And yet much of it is research

*[Feb 27 11:31:03 2019] Shutting down Netalyzr  
“After nearly a decade of providing this service we have decided to shut down Netalyzr in the first week of March 2019.... We simply no longer have the resources to advance Netalyzr or to provide reasonable support for your many questions about connectivity problems.*



# What FCC is measuring: access bandwidth

(4K video=  
15-25 Mbps/sec)

|           | Downstream bandwidth      |
|-----------|---------------------------|
| Satellite | 12-25Mbps                 |
| DSL       | 3-45Mbps                  |
| Cable     | 100-200Mbps               |
| Fiber     | 100-100Mbps (sym, stable) |


## Limitations:

Rural regions not well sampled (see recent Microsoft data)

Does not measure interconnection performance

Does not capture many things consumers care about  
performance to top 10 sites, privacy, data caps

Does not measure mobile (mobile data released 2019,  
no analysis/report)



FCC MBA program, "8th Measuring Broadband America  
Fixed Broadband Report" (2017 data, 10K homes)

# Since 2007, same concerns have expanded

- To multiple **platform** layers
  - Gathering & analyzing evidence difficult. Validating harder.
  - Complex sector. And complexity increasing.
  - More at stake → more at risk

## Concerns from 2007 FTC broadband report

**blockage, degradation, and discrimination of content/apps**

vertical integration

effects on innovation at edges

lack of "last-mile" access competition

legal and regulatory uncertainty

diminution of political and other expression on the Internet



# Why so complex?

- Market, technology, legal, political, cultural, social forces interact in co-evolving adaptive systems
- Topology & traffic shifts not primarily driven by technology
- But if we do not understand the role, capabilities, and limitations of technology to *create* and *solve* problems, attempted interventions are likely to fail



# Evidence-based policy needs to understand:

- Internet operates as set of layered, multi-sided, platforms, interconnecting **across** layers, e.g., content to transit
- Platform structure and dynamics, including market sides and incentives
- How to achieve relevant transparency and public accountability related to specific potential harms
- How to find/fund sources of objective, unbiased expertise




# Technological Developments in Broadband Markets

## Internet Interconnection and Interdomain Routing: The Changing Landscape


**Nick Feamster**

Princeton University

Department of Computer Science



# Internet Routing in a Nutshell



- **Large-scale:** Thousands of autonomous networks
- **Self-interest:** Independent economic and performance objectives
- But, must cooperate for global connectivity

See <http://nms.lcs.mit.edu/~feamster/papers/dissertation.pdf>  
(Chapter 2.1-2.3) for optional coverage of the topic.




# Architecture: Loose Coordination

- There is **no central authority** that manages Internet interconnection.
- The Internet ecosystem arises from many **bilateral** and **multilateral** decisions of interconnecting networks.



# Internet Economics in a Nutshell




- **Transit:** One network pays for reachability to some set of destinations. (e.g., the rest of the Internet)
- **Peering:** Networks change traffic with one another
- Peering can be “settlement free” or “paid”




# A Brief History of the Internet




# The Pre-Commercial Internet (pre-1995)



# Internet Topology 1995-2005: Commercial Hierarchy



# Today's Internet: "Flat", Bilateral



# Market (and Performance) Trends

- **Pre-2013: Transit and Direct Interconnect**
  - Network performance determined by network path
- **2013 – Present: Distributed Cloud Services**
  - Performance determined by proximity of content to the user
  - “The network is the computer.”



# Two Significant Ongoing Developments

- **Traffic volumes are growing.**
  - Video traffic dominates
  - Video resolution is increasing.
- **Methods of delivering traffic are evolving.**
  - Internet traffic is increasingly being delivered via CDNs.
  - The “old Internet” was hierarchical. Now, mostly bilateral.
  - Distinction between CDNs and cloud services is smaller.






# Traffic Volumes are Growing



# Traffic is Growing, Driven by Video

| Year | Global internet traffic |
|------|-------------------------|
| 1992 | 100 GB per day          |
| 1997 | 100 GB per hour         |
| 2002 | 100 GB per second       |
| 2007 | 2,000 GB per second     |
| 2017 | 46,600 GB per second    |
| 2022 | 150,700 GB per second   |

26% CAGR  
2017-2022



\* Figures (n) refer to 2017, 2022 traffic share

Source: Cisco VNI Global IP Traffic Forecast, 2017-2022




# Methods of Delivering Traffic are Evolving




# Content Delivery Networks


Single Server



Content Delivery Network (CDN)





# The Rise of Content Delivery



- Content placement affects performance more than network paths.
- Content delivery affects traffic volumes, traffic balance on interconnects.

# The “Peering Playbook” (Hint: Everybody Wants to Win)





Exodus didn't think Genuity would risk disrupting its customers access to Exodus customers. The end result was de-peering and operational disruptions on both sides. Peering resumed only after both sides reached an agreement to spread the traffic load across more interconnection points across the U.S. to reduce the distance the Exodus traffic was carried on Genuity's infrastructure<sup>37</sup>.

The Chicken tactic is employed to abruptly change the peering relationship, and as the case above demonstrates, can have operational impact if neither side succumbs to the change and de-peers. It is worth pointing out that the aggressor of the Chicken Tactic rarely increases revenue from this tactic; the disruption is usually so significant and the destruction of relationship so severe that the "loser<sup>38</sup>" does not choose the aggressor as a supplier of transit services.

9. Traffic Manipulation: Increase Peer Transit Load


"Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming<sup>39</sup>."

The most devious of all the tactics presented is the Traffic Manipulation Tactic. One ISP targets a peer and forces its traffic over the potential peers' transit

<sup>37</sup> Conversations with the parties involved in the conflict.  
<sup>38</sup> It was also interesting to hear the heated debates over the definition of "loser" in this scenario.  
<sup>39</sup> <http://www.online-literature.com/suntzu/artofwar/15/> Lesson #22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambush. [Chang Yu's explanation is doubtless right: "When birds that are flying along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that soldiers are in ambush at the spot beneath."] Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. Our analogy here is that the traffic influx may be the traffic manipulation tactic.

services, to maximize the target ISP's cost of accessing its traffic. To illustrate, consider the figure below, where ISP A wants to peer with ISP B. ISP A forces its traffic to ISP B to go through ISP W, which is ISP B's Transit Provider, even though a lower cost path<sup>40</sup> exists.

After some time elapsed, ISP A opens a dialog with ISP B, who reviews the traffic analysis data and is surprised that ISP A has not appeared on the radar screen as a potential peer. Seeing the great transit expense that is paid for access to this traffic, the peering decision is easy for ISP B; ISP A is clearly a large traffic peer that is expensive to access over a transit link. Peering is established with the target.



Traffic manipulation stops<sup>41</sup> about a month after peering is established. Since only a very small percentage of ISPs do the traffic analysis<sup>42</sup> necessary to detect this maneuver, this tactic often goes undetected.

The Traffic Manipulation Tactic is most effectively deployed by network savvy Content Providers. Since web traffic is asymmetric, the producer of the responses (the content player) has the greater ability to force a larger amount of traffic along one path or another.


A few notes from the Peering Coordinators. First, this tactic requires a large amount of spare capacity to handle the manipulated traffic to go along either path<sup>43</sup>. Second, if the tactic is detected, the Peering Coordinator Community is small enough that everyone in the community hears about it. At the same time, Traffic Manipulation is used by some ISPs as a way to manage Traffic Volume Ratio requirements for peering with the Tier 1 ISPs.

<sup>40</sup> Lower cost in the financial sense, not necessarily the routing sense.  
<sup>41</sup> Anonymous. Multiple Content Companies have admitted to this maneuver.  
<sup>42</sup> "Internet Service Providers and Peering" research showed that fewer than 5% of ISPs have the resources for traffic analysis.  
<sup>43</sup> Anonymous.

6 Comments to the Author Welcome  
 <wbn@equinix.com>

# "Traffic Manipulation": Increase Transit Load

- "The most devious of all tactics..."
- One network targets a another by sending traffic over that network's transit links, to drive up costs.
- The targeted network decides to peer.



# Two Key Observations

- Traffic patterns (e.g., utilization) can be measured.
  - There are better and worse ways to do so.
  - Nothing is perfect yet, but computer scientists are working on it.
- At the core of this is business.
  - There is a lot of money at stake.
  - Interconnection costs money.
  - It's much better if “the other guy” pays.






# Looking Back: Retrospective on Interconnection




# 2013: The Internet Wasn't Ready for This

## High Latencies Across the Internet



## ...and Low Throughput





**(Figure 1)** Median download throughput achieved by customers of Comcast, Time Warner Cable, and Verizon in the New York City area when connecting across Transit ISP Cogent, January 2013 to September 2014.<sup>16</sup>

*ISP Interconnection and Its Impact on Consumer Internet Performance.*  
 Measurement Lab Report. October 2014.



# Who's to blame? (Corollary: Who should pay?)

Theory #1:  
At interconnection points



Theory #2:  
Inside the transit provider networks



- Access ISP?
- Transit provider?
- Both?







# Be Careful What You Read... Consider the Source

“It is important to note that while **we can infer that performance degradation is interconnection-related**, we do not have the contractual details and historical interconnection agreements. As such, we cannot consider whether parties apart from

**Not really...**


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# Other Ways to Look at Interconnects

## Actively measure the interconnects

- Pros: No special access, public data
- Cons: Cannot measure direct parameters (capacity, utilization)



## Directly report on interconnect utilization

- Pros: Direct data
- Cons: Special access, privacy concerns

## Interconnection Measurement Project

[Home](#)

[Visualizations](#)

[About the Data](#)


[Blog](#)

[Publications](#)

[Contribute Data](#)

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
Aggregate interconnection capacity and utilization



# Looking Ahead



# The Death of Transit and Peering Disputes



- Content placement affects performance more than network paths.
- Traffic, business decisions, and investments are becoming dominated by cloud services.
- The era of peering disputes is over.

# Market Consolidation Continually Shifts

- Access ISPs
- Transit ISPs
- CDN / Cloud services
- Private networks
- App stores
- Operating systems
- Software APIs

Control can consolidate in any one of these parts of the ecosystem.

Important to take a holistic view towards consumer protection. Five years ago, it was the interconnect.

Now, it is the CDN / distributed cloud.





# Summary

- **Traffic volumes are growing.**
  - Video traffic dominates.
  - Video resolution is increasing.
- **Methods of delivering traffic are evolving.**
  - Internet traffic is increasingly being delivered via CDNs.
  - The “old Internet” was hierarchical.
  - Now, mostly bilateral, and driven by CDNs/distributed cloud.
- These developments are playing out in a dynamic economic, political landscape.
  - Measuring the access link “speed” is only part of the picture.
  - Even measuring the interconnect is only part of the picture.
- Technologists can help bridge the gap between **what we can measure** and **what consumers care about** (ultimately, a good Internet experience).

Nick Feamster  
Princeton University  
[feamster@cs.princeton.edu](mailto:feamster@cs.princeton.edu)  
<https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~feamster/>



**Break**  
**10:15-10:30 am**



# Speed Advertising Claims, Substantiation, and Section 5

*Session moderated by:*

**Kristin Williams**

Federal Trade Commission  
Bureau of Consumer Protection



# The Federal Trade Commission Act

- Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.



# Deceptive Practices

- Representation or omission (failure to disclose)
- Likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances
- Material



# Unfair Practices

- Substantial injury
- Not reasonably avoidable
- Not outweighed by benefits to consumers or competition



# Advertising Law Basic Principles

- Advertising must be truthful and not misleading.
- Companies are responsible for all claims – express and implied – that reasonable consumers take from ad.
- Objective claims must be substantiated before they are made.



# Speed Advertising Claims, Substantiation, and Section 5

## Measuring Access Speed

**David Clark**

MIT Computer Science and  
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory





# Measures of quality

- Speed
  - More is better, up to a point.
- Latency
  - Less is better, down to a point.
- Loss
  - An idle link should not have packet loss.
- Usage
  - Video generates a lot of traffic



# Focusing on Wireline Access

- Cellular service has different measures of quality.
  - Speed is normally not part of marketing.
  - Emphasize reliability, coverage.
- Another conversation




# Summary

- Different measurement tools can give very different answers.
  - Different design, different objective, bugs.
- As speeds get higher, measurement becomes more difficult.
- Speed may not continue to be the flagship measure of quality.




# Some Measurements From 2010

1. FCC/Samknows (on-net, 10 second test)
2. Ookla/Speedtest
3. Measurement Lab/NDT
4. Iperf
5. Iperf-multithreaded



All tests from residence with Samknows unit.



Tests 2-5 to same server at MIT.




Download speeds (~10 second tests)



# Measuring a “Slow” Link

- Many different test methodologies will arrive at similar estimates of performance when the broadband access link is the bottleneck
- Increasingly not the case today
  - Gigabit broadband
  - Home WIFI problems




# How To Measure a “Fast” link

Consider two polar cases:

- 1) **Gigabit everywhere**
- 2) **Gigabit locally** – Gigabit islands

Intermediate cases to highlight options:

- 3) **Gigabit in aggregate**
- 4) **Gigabit to select destinations**



No longer the  
expected  
bottleneck



# Test Methodologies Differ

Only commonality across all these different popular tests is that they report speed test results in the same units (Mbps).


**MLAB**





# Comparison of measurement tools

- A single gigabit connection.



| Test                               | Flows      | Destinations | Deployment             | Server selection                           | Reported speed           | IPv6 | Implied performance expectation                   | Clear performance target |
|------------------------------------|------------|--------------|------------------------|--|--------------------------|------|---|--------------------------|
| <b>NDT</b>                         | Single     | Single       | S/W, crowdsource       | Nearby and server load                     | Total bytes/ Total time  | No   | Single off-net destination                        | No                       |
| <b>IHT</b>                         | Sequential | Multiple     | S/W, (NDT) crowdsource | Nearby and server load                     | Average of all tests     | No   | Single off-net destination                        | No                       |
| <b>Fast</b>                        | Parallel   | Multiple     | S/W, crowdsource       | Regular Netflix server selection algorithm | Average after ramp up    | Yes  | Aggregate performance to single content provider  | No                       |
| <b>DSL Reports</b>                 | Parallel   | Multiple     | S/W, crowdsource       |  | Total bytes / Total time | No   | Aggregate performance to multiple cloud providers | No                       |
| <b>Measuring Broadband America</b> | Parallel   | Single       | H/W, known sites       | On-net / quality off-net                   | Average after ramp up    | Yes  | Single on-net destination                         | Contracted service tier  |
| <b>Xfinity</b>                     | Parallel   | Single       | S/W, crowdsource       | On-net / off-net                           |                          | Yes  | Single on or off net destination                  | No                       |
| <b>Ookla</b>                       | Parallel   | Single       | S/W, crowdsource       | Nearby                                     | Average after ramp up    | No   | Single on or off net destination                  | No                       |



# Comparing Drawbacks

- Hardware based measurement:
  - Limited deployment
- Web/App based measurement:
  - Selection bias.
    - Frustrated people more likely to run test.
  - No knowledge of provisioned speed.
  - Host/home network impairments can limit utility.



# Questions for Consideration

- Are gigabit speeds important today?
  - How do these speeds relate to the user experience?
- How should market and regulatory expectations evolve as broadband access speeds increase toward gigabit speeds?
  - Will speed continue to be the flagship metric of service quality?
- What changes are occurring or need to occur in the major measurement platforms to improve the measurement of gigabit broadband?
- What should the research agenda be to address the technical and policy challenges of gigabit broadband?



# Further Reading

- Bauer, S., D. Clark, W. Lehr. *Understanding broadband speed measurements* [https://groups.csail.mit.edu/ana/Publications/Understanding\\_broadband\\_speed\\_measurements\\_bauer\\_clark\\_lehr\\_TPRC\\_2010.pdf](https://groups.csail.mit.edu/ana/Publications/Understanding_broadband_speed_measurements_bauer_clark_lehr_TPRC_2010.pdf)
- Bauer, Steven and Lehr, William and Mou, Merry, *Improving the Measurement and Analysis of Gigabit Broadband Networks* (March 31, 2016). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2757050>
- Bauer, Steven and Lehr, William and Hung, Shirley, *Gigabit Broadband, Interconnection, Propositions and the Challenge of Managing Expectations* (September 1, 2015). TPRC 43: The 43rd Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy Paper. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2586805>



# Speed Advertising Claims, Substantiation, and Section 5

## Measuring Internet Access “Speed”: Five Lessons

**Nick Feamster**

Princeton University

Department of Computer Science




# Summary: Five Lessons

- “Speed” has many facets.
- Different techniques measure different aspects of speed.
- Many factors can limit a client-based speed test.
- Faster “speed” doesn’t mean better performance.
- As speeds get faster, speed testing gets harder.




# “Speed” Has Many Facets

- Throughput (up, down)
- Latency
- Jitter
- Packet Loss





# Different Techniques Measure Different Aspects of Speed



Sundaresan, S., Burnett, S., Feamster, N., & De Donato, W. (2014, June). BISmark: A Testbed for Deploying Measurements and Applications in Broadband Access Networks. In *USENIX Annual Technical Conference* (pp. 383-394).

Sundaresan, S., De Donato, W., Feamster, N., Teixeira, R., Crawford, S., & Pescapè, A. (2011, August). Broadband internet performance: a view from the gateway. In *ACM SIGCOMM* (Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 134-145). ACM.


Ookla, SamKnows Design: "Link Capacity"

# Many Factors Limit a Client-Based Speed Test


- Client device (hardware, software)
- Home network
- Network path
- Measurement server infrastructure
- Test parameters (length, # connections)



# The Device Can be the Bottleneck



# The Home Network Can Be the Bottleneck



**Wireless bottlenecks are common, especially as throughput increases**

**Access link bottlenecks are rare, only happens at low throughput**


**Homes with throughput greater than 35 Mbits/s almost never see access link bottleneck. (2015)**

Sundaresan, S., Feamster, N., & Teixeira, R. (2016, March). Home network or access link? locating last-mile downstream throughput bottlenecks. In *International Conference on Passive and Active Network Measurement* (pp. 111-123).

# The Network Path can be the Bottleneck


**Latencies from South Africa to Kenya, Brazil, India are 2x higher than latencies to Europe.**

**Connectivity to Australia, Japan also shows higher latency.**



Gupta, A., Calder, M., Feamster, N., Chetty, M., Calandro, E., & Katz-Bassett, E. (2014, March). Peering at the Internet's frontier: A first look at isp interconnectivity in Africa. In *International Conference on Passive and Active Network Measurement* (pp. 204-213).


# Faster Speed Doesn't Mean Better Performance



**Page load time stops improving above 16 Mbits per second.**

Sundaresan, S., Feamster, N., Teixeira, R., & Magharei, N. (2013, October). Measuring and mitigating Web performance bottlenecks in broadband access networks. In *ACM SIGCOMM Internet measurement conference* (pp. 213-226). ACM. **Community contribution award.**

# Application Performance Doesn't Always Need “Top Speed”



# User Experience Depends on Application Performance

- **Startup delay:**  
How long does the video take to start playing?
- **Video resolution:**  
What is the resolution of the video?
- **Bitrate changes:**  
Does the video bitrate change during playback?
- **Rebuffering events:**  
Does the video re-buffer during playback?






# As Speeds Get Faster, Speed Testing Gets Harder


- Measuring access links is getting harder.
- Conventional tests take more data.
- Bottlenecks are moving elsewhere.
- Apps don't saturate the access network capacity.


## TRACKING CABLE'S TOP INTERNET SPEEDS



# The Gigabit Era: The Future is Passive

- Estimate application performance using mostly passive measurements **without breaking encryption**
- Device is in-line, between cable modem and user's wireless router, or off-path
- Implemented in Go for low-cost devices (Raspberry Pi, Odroid) on home networks
- Pilot home network deployment: ~60 in US, ~10 in Paris





# Summary

- “Speed” has many facets.
- Different techniques measure different aspects of speed.
- Many factors can limit a client-based speed test.
- Faster “speed” doesn’t mean better performance.
- As speeds get faster, speed testing gets harder.
- The future of testing is passive application monitoring.

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<https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~feamster/>



# Speed Advertising Claims, Substantiation, and Section 5 NAD Cases

**Laura Brett**

National Advertising Division  
Advertising Self-Regulatory Council



# Telecommunications Challenges


Companies that Participated in Self-Regulation:

AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, Sprint, Comcast, Charter, DIRECTV, DISH and Frontier.


34 Cases involving express or implied speed claims



# NAD Telecom Cases by Year



The results are in.



XFINITY delivers the fastest Internet in America, based on over 60 million consumer tests run at Speedtest.net.

Get started with TV, Internet & Voice

**\$30** each month for 12 months with new service activation

Get up to **75 Mbps** of speed

**Fastest** in-home WiFi

Plus, ask how to get a **\$250** prepaid card

Two-year agreement required. Bill to reflect monthly charge for bundle as \$89.99/mo. for 12 months.

Call 1-800-XFINITY | Visit xfinity.com

Experience XFINITY at an XFINITY Store near you.

Pennsylvania: Philadelphia, Roosevelt Mall, 2329 Cottman Ave.; 1351 S. Christopher Columbus Blvd.; 3903 Mainline Ave.  
 Langhorne, 5 B. Duffin Rd.; York, 114 W. Township Line Rd.  
 New Jersey: Mt. Lakes, Cornerstone Square Shops, 42 Centerton Rd.



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AT&T. The nation's **FASTEST** and



**MOST RELIABLE** 4G LTE network.

SWITCH TO T-MOBILE

**FASTER**

AMERICA'S

**FASTEST**

**4G LTE**

NETWORK



**4G LTE**

**MORE SPEED. MORE POWER. MORE CHOICES.**

Verizon is the place with the largest selection of 4G LTE devices on America's Fastest, Most Advanced 4G Network.



# Speed Advertising Claims, Substantiation, and Section 5

## First Principles of Advertising: Implications for Speed Claims

**Debra J. Ringold**

Willamette University

Atkinson Graduate School of  
Management



# “...Advertising Seeks to Persuade and Everyone Knows It” (Calfee 1997)

- Consumers are skeptical of claims designed to differentiate, generic claims, and advertising as an activity
- Consumers make distinctions between search, experience, and credence attribute claims
- Consumers use advertising claims to form working hypotheses they test in a variety of ways



# Advertising Communicates Information and Shapes Markets

- Most effective when communicating “new” information of “value” to consumers
- Small numbers of information sensitive consumers can affect price, quality, etc. and market structure



# Power Has Shifted to the Consumer

- Advertisers speak in the context of the Internet
- Consumers overcome traditional market asymmetries
- Consumers band together against producers
- Consumers shape the value chain, often in record time



# “Do You Have the Internet Speed You Need?”<sub>(FTC 2019)</sub>

- Most/many consumers don't trust/like their ISP
- 95% know what kind of Internet service they have
- Internet speed calculators, expert advice abounds
- Free on-line services evaluate Internet speed




# Speed Advertising Claims, Substantiation, and Section 5

**Joshua Stager**

Open Technology Institute

New America




# Speed Advertising Claims, Substantiation, and Section 5


## Panel Discussion:

Laura Brett, David Clark, Nick Feamster,  
Debra J. Ringold, Joshua Stager

**Moderator:** Kristin Williams



**Break**  
**12:00-1:00 pm**






# Evolving Markets and Technological Developments: Market Structure


*Session moderated by:*

**Ruth Yodaiken**  
Federal Trade Commission  
Office of Policy Planning



# **Evolving Markets and Technological Developments: Market Structure**


**Matthew A. Brill**  
Latham & Watkins LLP



# **Evolving Markets and Technological Developments: Market Structure**

## **Smaller Cable Operator Views on Broadband Markets, Technologies and Competition**

**Thomas A. Whitaker**  
Shentel



# Overview: Broadband Markets Served by Smaller Cable Operators

- In rural broadband markets served by smaller cable operators,\* despite higher costs to serve, competition exists and supply is growing
  - Network and service investment by smaller operators has been substantial and will continue to grow
    - Today most housing units served by smaller operators can receive DOCSIS 3.0 service (at least 100 Mbps), and performance is certain to increase<sup>1</sup>
  - Prices (as measured per Mbps) have declined rapidly<sup>2</sup>
  - New providers, including fixed and 4G wireless, satellite and electric coops, are constantly seeking to enter the broadband market in rural areas
- While smaller operators in rural markets have built to many unserved locations, consumers in more remote areas may be unserved; over the past 5 years, federal and state programs have reduced the number of unserved homes substantially, and these programs continue to work<sup>3</sup>

\* Smaller cable operators initially provided traditional Pay TV service and moved into providing broadband service 25 years ago; today, as video margins have eroded, their predominant offering is broadband

# Identifying Smaller Cable Operators That Provide Broadband Service

- Smaller cable operators serve about 8M broadband subscribers and pass about 17M housing units<sup>4</sup>
  - Shentel has ~75,000 broadband subscribers in VA, WV, and PA rural areas
- Most smaller cable operators, like Shentel, provide broadband service in rural markets
  - In general, smaller cable operators in rural markets for broadband service face more challenging economics because they lack network and operational scale, locations are less dense, and consumers are less well-off
- Other smaller operators “overbuild” incumbents in more urban markets
  - Overbuilders, like RCN and WOW!, further ensure robust competition but face challenging economics because they enter markets where incumbent providers already provide service, need to expend large amounts of capital upfront to build a network, and need to achieve scale rapidly to be viable



# Smaller Cable Operators Face Competition in Downstream Broadband Markets

- Smaller cable operators' competitors in rural areas\* in downstream markets --
  - **Incumbent telephone providers**
    - Virtually all smaller cable operators compete with an incumbent telco
    - For Shentel, the incumbent CenturyLink is a strong competitor because it provides 25 Mbps service at a low price point to loyal customers
  - **Other wireline entrants, like electric coops**
    - Electric coops have existing infrastructure (e.g., poles) and operations
    - In Virginia, CVEC is overbuilding Nelson County Cablevision with an all-fiber network<sup>5</sup>
  - **Fixed wireless providers**
    - Fixed wireless providers have a low entry cost and tend to serve “value” customers with sufficient broadband speeds at prices 10-20% below wireline providers
  - **Satellite providers**
    - Satellite providers have capacity limits but a low entry cost and target “value” customers
  - **4G Mobile providers**
    - Many “value” customers can afford only one provider and often want mobile capability

\*Overbuilders in more urban markets face competition from incumbent cable and telco providers, as well as mobile providers



# Smaller Cable Operators Face Competition in Downstream Broadband Markets

- The existence of competition in downstream rural and “overbuild” markets served by smaller cable operators is indicated by –
  - **Increasing Supply (Investment)**
    - Smaller operators have invested over \$12B in the past decade to upgrade their networks to DOCSIS 3.0/3.1 and continue to invest more than \$1B annually<sup>6</sup>
    - Shentel has invested more than \$125M over the past 5 years and will invest another \$25M this year
  - **Declining Prices (on a per Mbps basis)**
    - Broadband prices for smaller operators have declined substantially on a per Mbps basis<sup>7</sup>
    - Shentel just reduced prices from \$3/Mbps to \$.50/Mbps; it offers 50 Mbps--\$50/month, 150 Mbps--\$80/month, and 300 Mbps--\$110/month<sup>8</sup>
  - **Good Customer Service**
    - Smaller cable operators are recognized for their customer service<sup>9</sup>
    - Shentel was the independent operator of the year in 2017<sup>10</sup>



# Smaller Cable Operators Have No Leverage in Upstream Broadband Markets

- Because smaller cable operators in rural markets\* have fewer subscribers (traffic and “eyeballs”) and networks with no, or at most limited, regional reach --
  - Most smaller operators seeking to interconnect and exchange traffic with peering providers, edge providers, and CDNs need to use and pay a transit provider to carry traffic to and from an internet exchange points (IEP)
  - Shentel is somewhat unique in that its networks are relatively proximate to major IEPs and it has sufficient traffic to justify building to IEPs, but even then, it must pay for peering

\*Overbuilders in more urban markets generally carry traffic to IEPs but must pay for peering





# Concluding Thoughts about Broadband Markets Served by Smaller Cable Operators

- By virtually any measure, broadband service in markets served by smaller cable operators is a “good news” story
- Government can further increase supply by –
  - Removing barriers to network deployment, including by ensuring providers have timely access at reasonable cost to poles/conduit/ducts and to public and private rights-of-way
  - Awarding subsidies efficiently in “unserved markets” for the deployment of robust broadband networks
- Government also should ensure consumers have reasonable access to clear, accurate, and sufficient information about broadband service rates, terms, and conditions to select a provider and service tier



# End Notes

- <sup>1</sup> See *Communications Market Report et al.*, GN Docket No. 18-231 *et al.*, Report, FCC 18-181 at Fig. G-4 (Dec. 26, 2018)
- <sup>2</sup> See Comments of the Fiber Broadband Association, FCC WC Docket No. 17-108 at 7-15 (July 17, 2017)
- <sup>3</sup> Locations being served from FCC Connect America Fund Phase I – 638k; Phase II – 4.331M. Additional locations served from RUS Broadband Loan and Community Connect Grant programs and state programs such as the New York State Broadband program
- <sup>4</sup> *Connecting Hometown America*, American Cable Association Paper, (2014) available at [www.americancable.org](http://www.americancable.org)
- <sup>5</sup> “Central Virginia Electric Cooperative Announces First Stop in Appomattox for Fiber Network Installation,” (June 22, 2018) available at <https://www.mycvec.com/news/detail/central-virginia-electric-cooperative-announces-first-stop-in-appomattox-for-fiber-network-installation>
- <sup>6</sup> Derived from ACA member public announcements, discussions with ACA members, and SEC filings
- <sup>7</sup> See note 2 above
- <sup>8</sup> \*The FCC’s 2019 Urban Rate Benchmark: 50/5 Mbps for ~\$100/month; 100/10 Mbps for ~\$106/month; 250/25 Mbps for ~\$129/month
- <sup>9</sup> See “Readers’ Choice Awards 2018: Internet Service Providers, PC Magazine (May 23, 2018)
- <sup>10</sup> Shentel, Cablefax’s Independent Operator of the Year (June 8, 2017) available at <http://www.cablefax.com/eventsawardswebinars/cablefaxes-top-ops-luncheon>





# Evolving Markets and Technological Developments: Market Structure

## Panel Discussion:

Matthew A. Brill, Thomas A. Whitaker,  
Tithi Chattopadhyay, John Bergmayer,  
kc claffy

**Moderator:** Ruth Yodaiken





# **Evolving Markets and Technological Developments: Market Structure**

**Tithi Chattopadhyay**  
Princeton University  
Center for  
Information Technology Policy



# Overview

## Market Structure

- The Network – Stakeholders and their relationships
- Investments in Broadband – Factors impacting investments
- Outcomes – How does one assess competition in this market?

What is going on in State Governments?



# Market Structure: The Network


- Different stakeholders
  - Broadband providers – access & backbone
  - Edge providers
  - Consumers – residential, business and CAIs
- Other considerations for broadband stakeholders
  - Different technologies
  - Rural and urban markets



# Market Structure: The Network

Economic relationships in the network

- Factors that determine prices in two-sided markets
  - Relative size of the other group
  - Price sensitivity of user groups
  - Type of fee levied





# Market Structure: Investments

Factors impacting investments in this market

- Price discrimination – quality, quantity and market segments
- Product differentiation
- Other investment challenges – density of subscribers, regulatory hurdles, competitive hurdles



# Market Structure: Outcomes

- Competition in this market
  - Horizontal relationships
  - Vertical relationships
- What does this mean to a consumer?
  - Switching costs
  - Understanding commercial terms & performance
    - What's changing?
  - Application specific information
    - Disclosing leveraging practices



# What is going on in State Governments?

- Section 706 - Pertained to encouraging and incentivizing deployment of broadband technology
- After the 2017 FCC ruling – Four different strategies employed
  - Do nothing
  - Sue the FCC
  - Enhancing requirements for state contracts and grants
  - Direct state level laws
- Transparency and data collection
  - Passive testing and deployments
- Rural deployments




# Evolving Markets and Technological Developments: Market Structure

## Panel Discussion:


Matthew A. Brill, Thomas A. Whitaker,  
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kc claffy

**Moderator:** Ruth Yodaiken



# **Evolving Markets and Technological Developments: Market Structure**

**John Bergmayer**  
Public Knowledge





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
**Moderator:** Ruth Yodaiken





# Break

## 2:15-2:30 pm






# Evolving Markets and Technological Developments: Policy Applications

*Session moderated by:*


**Suzanne Munck**

Federal Trade Commission  
Office of Policy Planning



# **Evolving Markets and Technological Developments: Policy Applications**


**Christopher S. Yoo**  
University of Pennsylvania



# Evolving Markets and Technological Developments: Policy Applications


**Gigi Sohn**

Georgetown Law Institute for  
Technology Law & Policy



# Evolving Markets and Technological Developments: Policy Applications


**Berin Szoka**  
TechFreedom



# **Evolving Markets and Technological Developments: Policy Applications**


**Mitch Stoltz**

Electronic Frontier Foundation



# **Evolving Markets and Technological Developments: Policy Applications**


**Tom Struble**  
R Street Institute



# **Evolving Markets and Technological Developments: Policy Applications**

**Tejas N. Narechania**

University of California, Berkeley  
School of Law




# Evolving Markets and Technological Developments: Policy Applications

## Panel Discussion:

Christopher S. Yoo, Gigi Sohn,  
Berin Szoka, Mitch Stoltz,  
Tom Struble, Tejas N. Narechania


**Moderator:** Suzanne Munck





# Break


4:00-4:15 pm



# Identifying Efficiencies and Remediating Competitive Harms in Broadband Markets

*Session moderated by:*

**Suzanne Munck & Katherine Ambrogi**  
Federal Trade Commission  
Office of Policy Planning




# Identifying Efficiencies and Remedying Competitive Harms in Broadband Markets

**Howard Shelanski**


Georgetown University Law Center

Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP




# Identifying Efficiencies and Remedying Competitive Harms in Broadband Markets

**Michelle P. Connolly**  
Duke University  
Department of Economics




# Identifying Efficiencies and Remediating Competitive Harms in Broadband Markets

**William Blumenthal**  
Sidley Austin LLP



# Identifying Efficiencies and Remediating Competitive Harms in Broadband Markets


**Jonathan B. Sallet**  
Benton Foundation



# Identifying Efficiencies and Remediating Competitive Harms in Broadband Markets

**Michael L. Katz**

University of California, Berkeley  
Haas School of Business



# Identifying Efficiencies and Remediating Competitive Harms in Broadband Markets

## Panel Discussion/Hypotheticals:

Howard Shelanski, Michelle P. Connolly,  
William Blumenthal, Jonathan B. Sallet,  
Michael L. Katz

**Moderators:** Suzanne Munck & Katherine Ambrogi





# Hypothetical 1

An ISP supports a videoconferencing application for two years, until it discontinues support of the application. As a result, the ISP's customers no longer can access the videoconferencing program.

The ISP says that it discontinued service because the program uses too much data.

The press reports that the ISP is developing a competing videoconferencing service, although that service is not yet available to consumers.



# Hypothetical 1

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The ISP says that it discontinued service because the program uses too much data.

The press reports that the ISP is developing a competing videoconferencing service, although that service is not yet available to consumers.

- ***What if:* The ISP has supported multiple videoconferencing applications for two years, including its own service. Now that its own service is more established, it discontinues support of previously supported competing services.**



# Hypothetical 2

An ISP has 60% share in the relevant market. It does not provide a voice over internet protocol (VoIP) service, but several VoIP providers offer over the top service available via the ISP. The ISP enters into a contract with a VoIP provider who pays a fee to the ISP in exchange for preferred network management. A public interest group files a complaint with the FTC that customers of the OTT VoIP Services are experiencing service disruptions.



# Hypothetical 2

An ISP has 60% share in the relevant market. It does not provide a voice over internet protocol (VoIP) service, but several VoIP providers offer over the top service available via the ISP. The ISP enters into a contract with a VoIP provider who pays a fee to the ISP in exchange for preferred network management. A public interest group files a complaint with the FTC that customers of the OTT VoIP Services are experiencing service disruptions.

- ***What if:* The ISP prevents customers from using the OTT VoIP services.**



# Hypothetical 3

An ISP and a content delivery network (CDN) each have 60% share of their relevant markets. The ISP and CDN enter into a merger agreement. There is no direct overlap between the services offered by the merging parties. The ISP plans to integrate the CDN service into its network, and only offer the CDN content to its customers.



# Hypothetical 3

An ISP and a content delivery network (CDN) each have 60% share of their relevant markets. The ISP and CDN enter into a merger agreement. There is no direct overlap between the services offered by the merging parties. The ISP plans to integrate the CDN service into its network, and only offer the CDN content to its customers.

- ***What if:* the ISP offers the CDN to its customers as part of their fee-for-service, but creates a pay-wall for customers who access the CDN content via other ISP services?**



# Hypothetical 4

Two IP platforms operate their own private IP networks. The platforms also serve content to the public internet. The platforms create a joint venture by which they create a private platform for customers through which they offer prioritized network management for paying clients.



# Thank You

## **Hearing #11: March 25-26**

The FTC's Role in a Changing World  
Federal Trade Commission, Headquarters

## **Hearing #12: March 25**

Roundtable with  
State Attorneys General  
Federal Trade Commission, Constitution Center

